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I. INTRODUCTION
In the1980s, state legislatures in all fifty states enacted statutes
commonly referred to as "right-to-farm" laws.' Arkansas enacted its right-
to-farm law ("the Act") in 1981.2 While there are similarities, these laws
differ from state-to-state. 3  All right-to-farm laws provide agricultural
producers with statutory defenses to nuisance challenges, subject to certain
* Goeringer is a Research Associate with the Center for Agricultural and Natural
Resources Policy, Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources Economics,
College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of Maryland. Mr. Goeringer
is licensed to practice law in Oklahoma.
**Goodwin is a Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness,
Dale Bumpers College of Agricultural, Food & Life Sciences at the University of
Arkansas.
1. See Adam Van Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as "Takings" in Light of Bormann
v. Board of Supervisors and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Association, 11 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 169, 170 **2006). For a survey of all fifty states right-to-farm
laws, see Neil D. Hamilton & David Bolte, Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in
the United States: A Fifty-State Analysis, 10 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99 *1988).
2. Hamilton & Bolte, supra note 1, at 104.
3. See generally Hamilton & Bolte, supra note 1.
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conditions.4 As one scholar has noted, right-to-farm laws are designed "to
protect existing farm investments by reducing actions under nuisance law
that enjoined agricultural activities."' These laws also work to preserve
farmland and protect established farmland from the pressures of
urbanization, allowing "farmers to continue with their husbandry pursuits
rather than enjoining them from farming due to the presence of a
nuisance."6
Legal scholars have written much about right-to-farm laws.7 This
article will not attempt to recover areas already covered by those authors.
Instead, this article will discuss the statutory protections offered by the Act
to an agricultural producer. Section II.A will deal with general background
on right-to-farm laws. Section II.B of the article will focus on the Act's
specific provisions. This section will encompass who is protected, what
agricultural operations are protected, the exemptions the Act contains, and
the affect of the Act on local and county ordinances in Arkansas. Section
II.C covers constitutional takings that might arise out of the Act.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Right-to-Farm Laws Generally
Right-to-farm laws typically can take two approaches: 1) codifying
the "coming to the nuisance" defense.' According to one source, "the fact
4. See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do




6. Id. at 88.
7. See Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Ethics and Economics of Right-to-Farm
Statutes, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 481 (1986) (reviewing the economic efficiency of
right-to-farm statutes); Tiffany Dowell, Daddy Won't Sell the Farm: Drafting Right to
Farm Statutes to Protect Small Family Producers, 18 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 127
(2008-09) (looking at important provisions in the laws); Jeffry R. Gittins, Bormann
Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Right-to-
Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381 (2006) (looking at the constitutionality of the
laws); Jennifer L. Beidel, Pennsylvania's Right-to-Farm Law: A Relieffor Farmers or
an Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 PENN STAT. L. REV. 163 (2005) (looking at
Pennsylvania's right-to-farm law); Steven J. Laurent, Michigan's Right to Farm Act:
Have Revisions Gone Too Far?, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 213 (2002)
(reviewing Michigan's right-to-farm law); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A.
Feitshans, Nuisance Revisited After Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121
(2000) (looking at the takings issue), available at http://nationalaglawcenter.org
/assets/bibarticles/richardsonfeitshans nuisance.pdf.
8. Centner, supra note 4, at 95.
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that the complainant 'came to the nuisance' constitutes a defense or
operates as an estoppel[;]" 9 and 2) limiting the statutory period in which
nuisance suits can be brought, such as requiring nuisance suits to be
brought within one-year of the establishment of the agricultural operation.10
With this defense, the right-to-farm law will provide a period of time from
the establishment of the operation when a nuisance suit must be brought.
The Act takes both of these approaches, as well as adding other statutory
protections and exemptions."
B. Arkansas's Right-to-Farm Law
The stated purpose of the Act is "to reduce the loss to the state of its
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which
agricultural operations may be deemed to be a nuisance." 2 To limit the
circumstances under which agricultural operations can be deemed a
nuisance, the legislature created provisions to help protect Arkansas
agricultural operations from the encroachment of nonagricultural land uses.
1. What is an "Agricultural Operation"
The Arkansas legislature clearly intended the Act to protect
Arkansas's agricultural operations, and in so doing, broadly defined what is
considered an "agricultural operation." 3 An "agricultural operation" is
defined as follows:
an agricultural, silvicultural, or aquacultural facility or
pursuit conducted, in whole or in part, including:
(A) The care and production of livestock and livestock
products, poultry and poultry products, apiary products,
and plant and animal production for nonfood uses;
(B) The planting, cultivating, harvesting, and processing of
crops and timber; and
(C) The production of any plant or animal species in a
controlled freshwater or saltwater environment[.] 4
9. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 373 (2009).
10. Centner, supra note 4, at 95.
11. Arkansas's right-to-farm statute is codified at sections 2-4-101 through 2-4-108
of the Arkansas Code.
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101 (West 2009).
13. See Id.
14. Id. § 2-4-102. "Apiary products" would be honey.
2013] 3
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The breadth of this statutory definition has never been fully explored
by an Arkansas court. It would be a safe assumption that agricultural
producers involved in traditional agricultural operations, such as livestock
and row crops, would be protected under the Act. Newer, more non-
traditional "agricultural operations" may be determined by an Arkansas
court on a case-by-case basis.
Other states' courts have recognized non-traditional "agricultural
operations" as covered by their states' right-to-farm laws. For example, a
Michigan court found that a pheasant hunting preserve qualified as a
"farming operation" under Michigan's right-to-farm law." In this case, the
court examined the definitions of "farm product" and "farm operations.", 6
The court determined that game birds constituted "'farm products' because
the[y] are useful to human beings and produced by agriculture." 7  The
court also determined that the "hunting of game birds on defendant's
property constitutes a 'farm operation' because it involves the 'harvesting
of farm products."" 8 The operation qualified as a "farm operation," and
because other relevant statutory conditions were satisfied, the court
afforded the defendants the protections of the right-to-farm law.' 9
On the other hand, a Texas court found that the raising of fighting
chickens did not qualify as an "agricultural operation" under Texas's right-
to-farm law.20 In Hendrickon, the court looked at the legislative intent in
passing Texas' right-to-farm law.2 1 The court found the legislative intent
was to protect those agricultural producers "who engaged in activities that
produce food[,]" and the raising of fighting chickens did not qualify as the
15. Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 WL 22872141, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2003), appeal denied, 683 N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 2004). Note that
Arkansas's law includes "farming operation" within "agricultural operation." See § 2-
4-102(1).
16. Milan Twp., 2003 WL 22872141, at *4. Michigan defines a "farm operation" as
"the operation and management of a farm or a condition or activity that occurs at any
time as necessary on a farm in connection with the commercial production, harvesting,
and storage of farm products[.]" Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(b)
(West 2009)). A "farm product" is defined as:
those plants and animals useful to human beings produced by agriculture and includes,
but is not limited to, forages and sod crops, grains and feed crops, field crops, dairy and
dairy products, poultry and poultry products . . . or any other product which
incorporates the use of food, feed, fiber, or fur, as determined by the Michigan
commission of agriculture.
Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(c) (West 2009)).
17. Milan Twp., 2003 WL 22872141, at *4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Hendrickson v. Swyers, 9 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 1999).
21. Id. at 300.
[VOL. 94
AN OVERVIEW OF ARKANSAS' RIGHT-TO-FARM LAW
production of food.2 2 These are just some examples of non-traditional
agricultural operations found to either fall under the protections of a state's
right-to-farm law or outside the protections.23
2. Types of Defenses Available
Under Arkansas's law, an agricultural operation cannot be enjoined
from operating due to a nuisance as long as certain statutory conditions are
met. The law provides three different statutory conditions that an
agricultural producer may fall under for the protections of the law. 24 The
three different statutory conditions include a one-year statute of repose,
employing methods commonly associated with agricultural production, and
establishing the operation before the complaining activities came.25  An
agricultural producer only needs to qualify under one of the three defenses
provided.26
i. Using Practices Commonly Associated With Agriculture
Section 1-4-107(b)(1) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in this
section, an agricultural operation shall not be found to be a public or
private nuisance if the agricultural operation alleged to be a nuisance
employs methods or practices that are commonly or reasonably associated
with agricultural production." 2 7 If the agricultural producer is using those
"methods or practices that are commonly or reasonably associated with
agricultural production,"2 8 then their operation will have "a rebuttable
presumption that an agricultural operation is not a nuisance." 29 Neither the
statute nor the Arkansas courts have defined "methods or practices that are
commonly or reasonably associated with agricultural production." 0
In other states, using accepted agricultural practices is seen as a way
to "encourage abstinence from poor husbandry practices that might
22. Id.
23. For more examples of activities found to be "agricultural operations" under
other states' right-to-farm laws, see Harrison M. Pittman, Validity, Construction, and
Application ofRight-to-Farm Acts, 8 A.L.R.6th 465 (2005).
24. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107 (West 2009).
25. See id
26. Each agricultural producer's situation will be different, and effectively planning
to defend against possible litigation may require the producer to consult with a licensed
attorney to help determine the proper defense the operation would qualify for.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107(b)(1) (West 2009).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 2-4-107(c)(2).
30. Id.
2013] 5
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
constitute a nuisance." 3' The typical problem with limiting right-to-farm
statutes to accepted agricultural practices is that a judicial determination
must be made regarding whether the agricultural practice is entitled to the
statutory right-to-farm defense. 32 A federal district court was unwilling to
extend Washington's right-to-farm law to protect a defendant who had "not
engaged in 'good forestry practices' as demonstrated by the fact that it
violated several water quality laws."33 In order to qualify for the statutory
defense, an Arkansas agricultural producer must abstain from poor
agricultural practices and avoid violating other state or federal laws.
If an agricultural operation is following those accepted agricultural
practices, it will not be found to be a public or private nuisance because of
limited activities or conditions such as: "(A) Change in ownership or size;
(B) Nonpermanent cessation or interruption of farming; (C) Participation in
any government-sponsored agricultural program; (D) Employment of new
technology; or (E) Change in the type of agricultural product produced."3 4
Any change in ownership, temporary halt in farming operations, an
interruption in farming, participation in any type of government
agricultural program, adoption of new technology, or change in crops or
livestock raised will still allow a producer to claim the law's statutory
defense of following accepted agricultural practices.
ii. The "Coming to the Nuisance" Defense
The next statutory defense the law provides is a codification of the
"coming to the nuisance" defense. Section 2-4-107(c)(1)(A) provides that
an agricultural operation will not become a public or private nuisance if it
"[w]as established prior to the commencement of the use of the area
surrounding the agricultural operation for nonagricultural activities[.]" 36 In
order to qualify for this statutory defense, the agricultural operation must
also use be using reasonable or commonly used agricultural practices.
31. Centner, supra note 4, at 107.
32. See id. at 109.
33. Gill v. LDI, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
34. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-107(b)(2)(A)-(E) (West 2009).
35. Examples of these programs include the Conservation Reserve Program, the
Conservation Security Program, and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program,
which would not eliminate the protections the law provides by following accepted
agricultural practices. CRS Report for Congress, Agricultural Conservation: A Guide to
Programs, Sept. 8, 2010, available at http://crs.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/
1 00ct/R40763.pdf.
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107(c)(1)(A) (West 2009).
37. Id. § 2-4-107(c)(1)(B).
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The coming to the nuisance defense is limited to nuisance claims by
future neighbors." The Supreme Court of Georgia found that statutory
coming to the nuisance defense did not apply when the plaintiffs use of
property had existed prior to the defendant's use.39 This is an exception to
the coming to the nuisance defense that agricultural producers rarely
consider. In order to qualify for the statutory defense, an agricultural
producer's use must be established before other neighboring landowners'
uses are established.
iii. One-year Limitations Period
The final defense in the law provides agricultural producers with a
limited period in which nuisance suits can be brought. The law provides
that:
An agricultural operation or its facilities or appurtenances shall not be
or become a public or private nuisance as a result of any changed
conditions in and about the locality after it has been in operation for a
period of one (1) year or more when the agricultural operation or its
facilities or appurtenances were not a nuisance at the time the agricultural
operation began.40
This provision means that a neighboring landowner who does not file
a nuisance action within one year of "the commencement of the offensive
activity may not successfully maintain the nuisance lawsuit."4 ' After one
year, unless the agricultural operation was a nuisance when it started, the
agricultural producer is exempt from nuisance suits brought by neighboring
landowners in the future. Decisions of states interpreting similar provisions
can also provide some guidance for an Arkansas court. These decisions
provide an Arkansas court with two differing interpretations. With the first
view, the Texas Supreme Court has found a provision similar to Arkansas's
42to be a statute of repose. According to the Texas court, "the relevant
38. See Centner, supra note 4, at 96-97.
39. Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 578-79 (Ga. 1981) (finding plaintiffs'
nonagricultural uses of their land were established before defendants built their egg
farm). See also Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Neb. 1985)
(finding defendants' hog farm was established after the plaintiffs had moved on their
property and statutory defense did not apply); Flansburgh v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127
(Neb. 1985) (holding plaintiffs' residential use of their property was established prior
to defendants' establishment of a hog farm on their property and statutory defense did
not apply).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107(a) (West 2009).
41. Centner, supra note 4, at 98.
42. Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2003). A "statute of repose" is
defined as "[a] statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the
defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period
2013] 7
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inquiry is whether the conditions or circumstances constituting the basis for
the nuisance action have existed for more than a year."43 This view is
followed by many states.44
The competing view has only been adopted by Minnesota. The Court
of Appeals of Minnesota, when reviewing a similar provision in
Minnesota's right-to-farm law, looked to the plain meaning of the section. 45
The court found that when "considering the timeliness of a nuisance claim
against a facility that has been in operation for more than two years [a
court] must determine whether ... the operation was a nuisance when [it
was] established.A 6  Simply put, if the agricultural operation was a
nuisance at the time the operation was established, the law would not
protect the operation.
Starting in 1984, the Arkansas attorney general has issued two
opinions on this provision of the law. Although not binding on a state
court, the opinions provide persuasive authority on how to interpret this
provision. In answering a question posed by the Department of Health on
the department's authority to promulgate regulations pertaining to general
sanitation, the attorney general found the one-year limitations provision
would not allow enforcement of those rules against facilities in operation
41for more than one year.
The attorney general appears to have adopted the Minnesota view.48
When evaluating the provision, the attorney general considered the General
Assembly's emergency clause, which stated:
that to permit any such facility which was not a nuisance
when established to be declared a nuisance and forced to
cease operations because of change in conditions in the
ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury." Black's Law Dictionary 1451
(8th ed. 2004).
43. Holubec, Il1 S.W.3d at 38.
44. See generally Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding Indiana's right-to-farm law barred claims if the operation had continually
operated for more than one year); Home v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (finding the defendant's poultry house had been in operation in a substantially
unchanged manner for more than one year prior to the plaintiffs filing the nuisance
suit); Aguilar v. Trujillo, 162 S.W.3d 839, 853-54 (Tex. App. 2005) (finding it
irrelevant when the plaintiffs discovered the circumstances constituting the nuisance
action if more than one year had passed); Barrera v. Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132
S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding nuisance claims for dust caused by cattle barred
because it had been in existence for more than one year).
45. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
46. Id.
47. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-199 (1986), 1986 WL 83826.
48. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-94 (1984), 1984 WL 63274, at *3-4.
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locality and after the facility has been in operation for a
long period of time is not only unfair to the owners,
operators and employees of such plant but is highly
detrimental to the economic growth and development of
the State...
The attorney general found this to mean that:
the spraying operation, if it be a nuisance, has been such
since its inception. Furthermore, this is not the case of an
acceptable operation becomming(sic) a nuisance as a result
of changed conditions in the area occurring after the
spraying had been in operation for a long period of time.
Therefore, Act 301 of 1981 should pose no barrier to a
private suit.50
An Arkansas court interpreting this one-year limitation provision
could choose from two alternatives. The Arkansas court could follow the
majority view to bar all nuisance suits against an agricultural operation
after the operation has been established for more than one year. The other
view is to look back to the establishment of the operation to determine if
the operation was a nuisance, and if so, allow nuisance suits against the
operation.
Again, it should be noted that each available defense described is one
of three possible choices that an Arkansas producer will have in defense of
a potential nuisance suit, and each defense is independent of the other. A
producer would want to consult with a licensed attorney to determine the
best defense for their operation.
3. Attorneys Fee Provision
Regardless of which view an Arkansas court adopts, an Arkansas
producer that successfully defends a nuisance suit brought by a neighboring
landowner may not be forced to pay the substantial legal bills that may
mount during the litigation process. This fee provision is not universal to
all states' right-to-farm laws, and Arkansas is unique for having such a
provision.5 1 Section 2-4-107(d) provides that the court may award
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. For a list of states' right-to-farm statutes with attorney's fee provisions, see Neil
D. Hamilton, A Livestock Producer's Legal Guide To: Nuisance, Land Use Control,
and Environmental Law 166-69 (Drake Univ. Agric. Law Ctr. 1992).
2013] 9
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52litigation expenses to the prevailing party. The litigation expenses
provided for in the Act would allow, in the court's discretion, the
prevailing party to collect "expert fees, reasonable court costs, and
reasonable attorney's fees[.]" 53  This provision helps to provide the
producer with some extra protection and provide for their litigation
expenses for successfully defending against a nuisance suit barred by the
Act.
4. Exclusions to the Law
The Act contains two exclusions when the right-to-farm defense or
defenses would not be available to an agricultural producer. Neither of the
two exclusions has been tested in an Arkansas court. With the first
exclusion, the Act will not provide a defense for the pollution of or change
in condition to the waters of a stream. 54 This exclusion provides that:
[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not affect or defeat the
right of any person, firm, or corporation to recover
damages for any injuries or damages sustained by them on
account of any pollution of or change in the condition of
the waters of any stream or on account of any overflow of
the lands of any person, firm, or corporation."
From a plain reading of the provision, an agricultural producer could
expect to lose the statutory defenses of the Act whenever their operations
are found to have caused pollution of a stream, a change in condition of a
stream, or cause water to overflow on a neighbor's land. An example of
this could occur when a rice producer floods a rice field. If any water
overflowed and caused damages to a neighboring landowner, the rice
producer would lose the defenses the Act provides from the damages
caused by the overflowing water. The same is true for any stream water
pollution or change in the condition of a stream caused by an agricultural
operation. Agricultural producers causing this type of damage also lose the
defenses provided by the Act.
The second exclusion does not exempt agricultural producers from
statutory obligations under federal or other state laws, such as federal and
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-107(d) (West 2009). This section provides "[t]he court
may award expert fees, reasonable court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party in any action brought to assert that an agricultural operation is a public
or private nuisance." Id.
53. Id.
54. See Id. § 2-4-106.
55. Id.
10 [VOL. 9
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state environmental laws. 56  The Act does not preempt federal
environmental laws because of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. An agricultural producer still needs to meet statutory duties
under federal laws.5 ' An example given by Grossman and Fischer is the
permit requirements for certain concentrated animal feeding operations
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 59 According to Grossman
and Fischer, the right-to-farm law may give protection for the nuisance
caused by the violation of the permit, but does not shield the agricultural
producer from EPA enforcement for the permit violation.6 0
The Act does not provide protection against liability incurred because
of a violation of a state environmental law. The Act, as Grossman and
Fischer point out, expresses "no intention in the language of those statutes
to repeal environmental laws applicable to farming operations."6' This
allows for both laws to "be interpreted consistently if right to farm laws are
construed not to affect the application of the environmental laws."62
In summary, in order to qualify for the statutory defenses of the Act,
agricultural producers must make sure that their agricultural operation is
not violating either of the two exclusions. The statutory defenses will be
lost if the agricultural producer causes pollution of a stream, a change in
condition of a stream, or water to overflow on a neighbor's land. Finally,
the Act will only provide statutory defenses for nuisance actions, and not
give general statutory defenses to all applicable federal and state laws.
5. Law's Affect on County and Local Ordinances
The Act limits the affect of local ordinances on agricultural
operations. The Act invalidates all municipal and county ordinances that
attempt to make agricultural operations nuisances. Section 2-4-105 reads:
56. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas
G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against
the Farmer, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 95, 150-57 (1983).
57. Id. at 150-51. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the
U.S. "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]" U.S. CONST. art. VI, §
2.
58. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 56, at 150.
59. Id at 151-52.
60. Id In fact under Arkansas law, compliance with such a permit would "create a
rebuttable presumption that an agricultural operation is not a nuisance." ARK. CODE
ANN. 2-4-107(c)(2) (West 2009).
61. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 56, at 153.
62. Id.
2013] 11
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Any and all ordinances adopted by any municipality or
county in which an agricultural operation is located
making or having the effect of making the agricultural
operation or any agricultural facility or its appurtenances a
nuisance or providing for an abatement of the agricultural
operation or the agricultural facility or its appurtenances as
a nuisance in the circumstances set forth in this chapter are
void and shall have no force or effect.63
But with few counties having set up county zoning boards, the extent
of the Act only currently applies to a limited number of counties in the
state." In these counties, this section would void all county or local
ordinances that have the effect of making an agricultural operation a
nuisance.
The Arkansas attorney general has issued a few opinions dealing with
this section of the Act. Although the opinions are not binding on an
Arkansas court, they provide persuasive authority to the courts. Using this
section, the attorney general has found that a city would have no
jurisdiction to adopt ordinances regulating livestock auction barns.65
In dealing with city ordinances prohibiting swine and poultry
operations in certain areas of the Town of Oak Grove, the attorney general
found that this provision would limit the city's power.66 The attorney
general found that this provision would invalidate any ordinance that tried
to regulate those agricultural operations "in existence for at least one year
prior to the ordinance's adoption."6 7
Finally, in dealing with a county having the authority to exclude a hog
farm from certain areas, the attorney general also found this provision
would limit the county's powers.68 The attorney general found that the hog
farm ordinance would be valid if it was a reasonable restraint on "property
owners so as not to cause injury to the property rights of their neighbors." 69
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-105 (West 2009).
64. For example, Washington County currently has ordinances in place to protect
agriculture and allow for the zoning of agriculture. See PARA Task Force
Recommendation for Establishing Various Zones and Implementing Zoning in
Washington County, Arkansas, http://www.co.washington.ar.us/PARA/PARA-
SummaryRecommendationl20805.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). This is just one
example of the type of zoning regulations that could exist for agriculture.
65. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-194 (1983), 1983 WL 52188.
66. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-120 (1987), 1987 WL 124416.
67. Id.
68. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-297 (1988), 1988 WL 279362.
69. Id.
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On the other hand, the ordinance that interfered with an existing
agricultural facility is void because of the local ordinance provision."
Other states have a similar provision in their right-to-farm laws, and
have dealt with the extent of the limits of the right-to-farm preemption of
local and county ordinances.7' The Alaska Supreme Court found that their
ordinance preemption provision did not preempt the enforcement of a
permit revocation requiring the agricultural producer to remove a fence. 72
The Connecticut Court of Appeals found their state's preemption provision
did not bar a local ordinance requiring a horse farm to submit a nutrient
management plan. 73 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held their right-
to-farm statute preempted a local ordinance, in which the municipality was
asserting that the agricultural operation had violated a local ordinance with
dust that came from pond excavation activities, and the court found the
right-to-farm law protected this activity. 74
Agricultural producers in Arkansas have protection from municipal
and county ordinances directed at making their operations nuisances in
areas. However, many producers are starting to feel the pressures of
urbanization and urban sprawl. This provision will preempt nuisance
ordinances that could be used to drive preexisting agricultural operations
out of the area, which is another protection the Act offers agricultural
producers in the state.
C. Constitutionality of the Right-to-Farm law
The final area of concern is the constitutionality of the Act." The
majority of states have upheld the constitutionality of their right-to-farm
70. Id
71. To view a thorough but not necessarily exhaustive compilation of similar state
provisions preempting local and county ordinances, see the National Agricultural Law
Center's Case Law Index for Urbanization and Agriculture decisions from January 1,
2002 to current, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/caseindexes
/urbanencroachment.html. For more cases, see Pittman, supra note 23.
72. Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 463 (Alaska 1991) (finding
"that statute is designed to provide a defense against a nuisance action, not against a
permit revocation under city ordinances.").
73. Ammirata v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Redding, 782 A.2d 1285, 1292
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 826 A.2d 170 (Conn. 2003) (finding
that the preemption law is limited to nuisance ordinances and the farm had not been
declared a nuisance).
74. Town of N. Kingstown v. Albert, 767 A.2d 659 (R.I. 2001). Again, these are
just examples and will only be persuasive to Arkansas courts deciding this issue. For
more examples of decisions on this issue, see Pittman, supra note 23.
75. For a review of federal takings law, see Jason Jordon, A Pig in the Parlor or
Food on the Table: Is Texas's Right to Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to
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laws when challenged. Like many other issues involving the state's right-
to-farm law, an Arkansas court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the
Act. Finding the Act unconstitutional would result in a loss of all the
statutory defenses the Act provides.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has twice found provisions of their right-
to-farm law to be unconstitutional.76 In Bormann v. Board of Supervisors,
the Supreme Court of Iowa found that a provision of the state's right-to-
farm law was unconstitutional.7 7 The court found that the immunity from
nuisance suits, in Iowa Code section 352.1 1(1)(a), "resulted in the Board's
taking of easements in the neighbors' properties for the benefit of the
applicants [defendants]. The easements entitle the applicants [defendants]
to do acts on their property, which . .. would constitute a nuisance."7 8 This
creation of an easement was found to be an unconstitutional taking and the
court invalidated this provision. 7 9
In Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L. C., the Supreme Court of Iowa found the
section to be indistinguishable from the one at issue in Bormann.80 Section
657.11(2) gave animal feeding operations a statutory defense against
nuisance claims brought by neighboring landowners.8 1  Relying on its
earlier decision in Bormann, the court invalidated the section as an
unconstitutional taking.82
When faced with the issue of the constitutionality of right-to-farm
laws, the majority of states have reached the opposite conclusion of the
Iowa courts. A Texas Court of Appeals rejected arguments that Texas's
Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 943 (2010). This article also provides the reader with a good overview of
the different types of nuisances.
76. Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In & For Kossuth County, 584 N.W.2d 309
(Iowa 1998); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004) (a summary of
the Gacke decision written by Jennifer Williams and provided by the National
Agricultural Law Center is available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets
/cases/gacke.html).
77. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 322.
78. Id. at 321.
79. Id. at 321-22.
80. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 173.
81. Id. at 171.
82. Id. at 175. For more detailed discussions on these two cases, see Centner, supra
note 5, at 117-41; Pittman, supra note 23, at sections 4-5, 7-8; Buskirk, supra note 1;
Jeffery R. Gittins, Bormann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the
Constitutionality of Right-to-Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381 (2006); Lynda J.
Oswald, At the Intersection of Environmental Law and Nuisance Law: Do Right-to-
Farm Statutes Result in Regulatory Takings?, 30 REAL EST. L. J. 69 (2001) (a copy of
these articles are available upon request from the author).
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right-to-farm statute is unconstitutional. 8 3 The Supreme Court of Idaho
rejected an argument to apply the Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning to their
right-to-farm law.84 The Indiana Court of Appeals also rejected an
argument to apply Iowa's ruling to Indiana's right-to-farm statute.85
Arkansas has no case law finding the right to maintain a nuisance
creates an easement. The Idaho and Indiana courts cited a lack of similar
case law as the reason to reject the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court.
Lacking similar case law, an Arkansas court would probably reject
arguments that the Act is unconstitutional.
This rejection would also be in line with the views of other legal
scholars. The coming to the nuisance defense, codified in section 2-4-
107(c)(1)(A), would be "a permissible extension of state law."86
"Legislatures can establish rules whereby persons who move next to a
nuisance are estopped from maintaining an action to abate the existing
nuisance."
The one-year limitations period, in section 2-4-107(a), would also
prevent the Act from being found unconstitutional. Professor Terrence
Centner has pointed out that similar limitation periods have withstood
judicial scrutiny.88 "Because statutes of limitation provide a window of
opportunity for bringing nuisance actions, there is no unconstitutional
deprivation of property rights."89 Neighboring landowners would have one
year in which to bring a nuisance claim, and not totally have that right
taken away.
Arkansas case law does not include the same case law that Iowa has
used to find its right-to-farm law unconstitutional. In comparing the
defenses to those noted by other legal scholars, the Act's defenses are
likely constitutional. But without specific facts and circumstances of such
a case, the Act would appear to be constitutional in most applications.
83. Barrera v. Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2004) (a
summary of this opinion written by Ross Pifer is available at http://www.nationalaglaw
center.org/assets/cases/barrera.html).
84. Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 96 P.3d 637 (Idaho 2004) (a summary of this
opinion written by Ross Pifer is available at http://www.nationalaglaw
center.org/assets/cases/moon.html). The Idaho court found no direct authority under
Idaho law that the right to maintain a nuisance was an easement. Moon, 96 P.3d at 644.
85. Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (a summary of this
opinion written by Paul Goeringer is available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.
org/assets/cases/lindsey.html). The Indiana court also found no authority in Indiana
"that the right to maintain a nuisance is an easement . . ." Lindsey, 898 N.E.2d at 1259.
86. Centner, supra note 5, at 138.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 139.
89. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Act provides many different statutory defenses to protect
agricultural operations in the state. The Act covers traditional agricultural
operations, such as rice, soybeans, and cattle. The Act may also cover
newer, non-traditional agricultural operations, but this would be up to a
court to decide.
A producer has three possible statutory defenses to use in potential
nuisance litigation brought by neighboring landowners: 1) use of accepted
agricultural practices; 2) the "coming to the nuisance" defense; and 3) a
one-year statutory limitations period. Each defense is independent of the
others, and a producer only needs to qualify for one of the three. When
facing a nuisance challenge in court, agricultural operators can pick the
defense that best meets their situation. Finally, if the producer wins the
nuisance action, the producer would be able to collect attorney's fees and
other costs from the neighboring landowner under the law.
Producers must also make sure their actions do not fall under an
exemption to the Act. Producers cannot maintain protection if they pollute
stream water, change the condition of a stream's water, or cause water to
overflow on the property of another. A producer engaging in any of these
three actions loses the protections of the Act. The Act also does not
provide a defense to violations of other federal or state laws. To maintain
the statutory defenses provided by the Act, producers must abide by these
restrictions.
The Act also limits the impact of county and local ordinances on
agricultural operations. The ordinances could not make the agricultural
operation into a nuisance, but other regulatory ordinances that do not make
an agricultural operation into a nuisance could exist under the Act.
Finally, in comparing the Act to the works of other legal scholars, the
Act appears to be constitutional. A legislature's adoption of the coming to
the nuisance defense is a permissible use of state law. Additionally, the
one-year limitation period allows a window of time for neighboring
landowners to bring claims. The Act does not appear to have the same
problems as Iowa's right-to-farm law, but this is ultimately a question that
will have to be answered by an Arkansas Court.
The Act has been offering the state's agricultural producers statutory
nuisance defenses and protections from local and county ordinances for
close to thirty years. In that time, the Act has not been challenged in court.
As areas of Arkansas continue to urbanize, the Act may see some legal
challenges to the extent of its protections. Agricultural producers can only
hope that Arkansas courts will interpret the Act in their favor.
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